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Abstract
Semantic research of the last decades has been shaped by an increasing interest in con-
ceptuality, that is, in emphasizing the conceptual nature of the meanings conveyed by 
natural language expressions. Among the multifaceted approaches emerging from this 
tendency, the article focuses on discussing a framework that has become known as »Two-
level Semantics«. The central idea it pursues is to assume and justify two basically 
distinct, but closely interacting, levels of representation that spell out the meaning of lin-
guistic expressions: Semantic Form (SF) and Conceptual Structure (CS). The distinction 
of SF vs. CS representations is substantiated by its role in accounting for related parallel 
distinctions including ‘lexical vs. contextually specifi ed meaning’, ‘grammar-based vs. con-
cept-based restrictions’, ‘storage vs. processing’ etc. The SF vs. CS distinction is discussed 
on the basis of semantic problems regarding polysemy, underspecifi cation, coercion, and 
inferences.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The turn to conceptuality
Looking back at the major trends of linguistic research in the 80’s and 90’s, we observe a 
remarkable inclination to tackle semantic issues by emphasizing the conceptual nature 
of the meanings conveyed by linguistic expressions. Several models and frameworks of 
linguistic semantics developed at that time marked off their specifi c view on meaning by 
programmatically labeling the structure they focus on as conceptual (cf. article 19 (Levin &
Rappaport Hovav) Lexical Conceptual Structure; article 30 (Jackendoff) Conceptual 
Semantics; article 27 (Talmy) Cognitive Semantics) and by elevating concepts, concep-
tualization, and Conceptual System to key words of semantic theorizing. The approach 
presented in this article is another outcome of these efforts, which implies that it shows 
commonalities with as well as differences from the approaches mentioned above.
The semantic issues which have been under debate since that time are summarized in 
(1) by listing the major topics and the crucial questions they have given rise to:
(1) a. compositionality: How far do we get by holding to the Frege Principle?
 b.  lexicalism:  What can provide a better account of the internal 
meaning structure of lexical items – semantic decomposi-
tion or meaning postulates?
 c.  meaning variation: How do we account for polysemy and underspecifi cation?
 d.  cognitivism:  How can we avoid “uninterpreted markerese” by drawing 
on semantic primes which are (i) compatible with our lin-
guistic intuition, (ii) reconstructible elements of our con-
ceptual knowledge, and which (iii) can be traced back to 
our perceptual abilities?
 e.  modularity:  How can we spell out and test the claim that our linguistic 
behavior results from the interaction of largely autono-
mous mental systems and subsystems?
 f.  interpretations:  What are the respective roles of word knowledge and 
world knowledge in specifying what is commonly dubbed 
“sentence meaning” vs. “utterance meaning” vs. “commu-
nicative sense”?
The answers to (1a–f) as provided by various frameworks differ to a certain extent, 
though on closer inspection they will presumably turn out not to be strictly incompatible. 
However, typical features of theoretical innovations in linguistics such as terminological 
rank growth, lack of concern in dealing with equivocations, and confi nement to selec-
tions of data and/or problems that are supportive of a given approach have impeded 
detailed comparisons between the competing approaches so far, but see Taylor (1994, 
1995), Geeraerts (2010). Space limitations prevent us from delving into this endeavor 
here. Instead, the article attempts to convey some of the motives and tenets of what 
has become known as Two-level Semantics (which, incidentally, is not a registered trade-
mark created by the adherents of the approach, but a label it received from reviewers) 
and restricts reference to kindred views to that of Conceptual Semantics expounded in 
Jackendoff (1996, 2002; article 30 of this volume).
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1.2. Basic assumptions
Two-level Semantics is not at variance with the other frameworks in recognizing the 
conceptual nature of, and in pursuing a mentalistic approach to, linguistic meaning. The 
major difference between the former and the latter is hinted at in the subtitle, which 
presents the distinction of two levels of representation, i.e. Semantic Form (SF) vs. Con-
ceptual Structure (CS), as the central issue this approach claims to deal with. The rela-
tions assumed to hold between SF and CS have in common that they induce certain 
asymmetries but they differ in the viewpoints that give rise to these distinctions. In the 
following, we briefl y discuss a selection of features that have been proposed to distin-
guish SF representations from CS representations. To clarify the signifi cance of these 
rather general claims, the goals and the problems connected with the assumptions will be 
commented on in more concrete terms.
(2) SF ⊂ CS
  In substance, SF representations may be conceived of as those subsets of 
CS representations that are systematically connected to, and hence covered 
by, lexical items and their combinatorial potential to form more complex 
expressions.
Strictly speaking, SF and CS here stand for two sets of elements (inventories) which make 
up the respective representations. Due to the conditions specifi ed in (3) and (4) below, SF 
representations and CS representations do not qualify as members of the same set – the 
former represent linguistic knowledge, the latter non-linguistic knowledge. The relation-
ship expressed in (2) comprises two aspects. The uncontroversial one is the subset –
set relation SF ⊂ CS which follows from the widely held view that for every linguistic 
expression e in language L there is a CS representation c assignable to it via SF(e), but 
not vice versa. It is obviously not the case that for every actual or latent CS item c there 
is an expression e in L with an SF(e) which makes c communicable to other speakers of 
L. Thus, (2) presupposes the existence of non-lexicalized concepts.
The problematic aspect of (2) is this: The view that CS representations are mental 
structures that mediate between language and the world as construed by the human 
mind implies that the Conceptual System provides representations whose contents 
originate in heterogeneous cognitive subsystems and which therefore have to be 
homogenized to yield knowledge structures that can be accessed and processed on the 
conceptual level. The conditions based on which, say, perceptual features stemming 
from vision, touch, proprioception etc. are conceptualized to fi gure in CS representa-
tions are far from clear. We will call this the “homogenization problem” posed by CS 
representations.
(3) grammar-based vs. concept-based
  SF representations account for the fact that the meanings of linguistic expressions 
come with grammatically determined kinds of packaging in terms of morpho-
syntactic categories and semantic types, while the elements of CS representations, 
due to their mental source and intermodal homogeneity, lack grammar-based 
wrappings.
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The distinction in (3) is not challenged in principle but it is under debate whether or not 
the types of grammatical packaging in which the meanings of linguistic expressions are 
conveyed yield a suffi cient condition to postulate SF as a representation level of its own. 
So, e.g., R. Jackendoff (article 30) does not absolutely exclude such a level in conceding 
“If it proves necessary to posit an additional level of »linguistic semantic structure« that 
is devoted specifi cally to features relevant for grammatical expression […], the addition 
of such an extra component would not at all change the content of Conceptual Struc-
ture, which is necessary to drive inference and the connection to perception”. Basically, 
however, he sticks to the view “that in fact such an extra component is unnecessary” 
(Jackendoff, this volume, p. 695). Let’s call this the “justifi cation problem” posed by the 
assumption of SF representations.
(4) linguistic vs. non-linguistic origin
  SF representations form an integral part of the information cluster represented by 
the lexical entries of a given language L, whereas CS representations are taken to 
belong to, or at least to be rooted in, the non-linguistic mental systems based on 
which linguistic expressions are interpreted and related to their denotations.
The distinction referred to in (4) by locating the roots of SF and CS representations in 
different though mutually accessible mental subsystems is the view taken by adherents 
of Two-level Semantics, cf. Bierwisch (1983, 1996, 1997, 2007); Bierwisch & Lang (1989a); 
Bierwisch & Schreuder (1992) for earlier works. Article 16 (Bierwisch) Semantic features 
and primes focuses on defi ning SF as an interface level whose basic elements, combi-
natorial rules, and well-formedness constraints directly refl ect the conditions on which
lexicon-based meanings of morpho-syntactically categorized, regularly combined lin-
guistic expressions are composed and interpreted. While article 16 may well be taken 
as a state-of-the-art report on arguments in favor of assuming SF as a level of repre-
sentation, much less attention is paid to CS representations that are supposed to 
connect the former with “the full range of mental structures representing the content to 
be expressed” (Bierwisch, this volume, p. 322).
So we face problems connected with the intermodal validity and the cross-modal 
origin of CS representations: (i) how to relate linguistically designated SF representa-
tions with conceptually homogenized CS representations? (ii) how to trace the latter 
back to their respective cognitive sources that are determined by crucially differing 
sensory modalities?
(5) storage vs. processing
  SF representations are linguistic knowledge structures that are accessibly stored in 
long-term memory, whereas CS representations are activated and compiled in working 
memory, cf. article 108 (Kelter & Kaup) Conceptual knowledge, categorization, 
and meaning.
The distinction that (5) establishes by locating SF and CS representations in long-term 
memory and working memory, respectively, marks out what experimental psycholinguis-
tics may contribute to clarifying the theoretically controversial interrelationship of SF 
and CS representations by drawing on evidence from language processing. The effects 
of taking (5) seriously can be expected to pay off in confi rming or disconfi rming the 
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distinction of SF vs. CS but also in providing criteria for deciding what requirements the 
representations at issue have to meet.
The methodologically most relevant conclusion drawn by Kelter & Kaup (article 
108) reads as follows: “researchers should acknowledge the fact that concepts and 
word meaning are different knowledge structures.” The claim in (5) suggests that if it 
is the SF of lexical items that is stored in long-term memory, the entries should be con-
fi ned to representing what may be called “context-free lexical meanings”, whereas CS 
representations compiled and processed in working memory should take charge of 
what may be called “contextually specifi ed (parts of) utterance meanings”. The differ-
ence between the two types of meaning representations indicates the virtual semantic 
underspecifi cation of the former and the possible semantic enrichment of the latter. There 
is a series of recent experimental studies designed and carried out along these lines 
which – in combination with evidence from corpus data, linguistic diagnostics etc. –
are highly relevant for the theoretical issues raised by SF vs. CS representations. 
Experiments reported by Stolterfoht, Gese & Maienborn (2010) and Kaup, Lüdtke & 
Maienborn (2010) succeeded in providing processing evidence that supports the 
distinction of, e.g., primary adjectives vs. adjectivized participles vs. verbal participles, 
that is, evidence for packaging categories relevant to SF representations. In addition, 
these studies reveal the processing costs of contextualizing semantically underspecifi ed 
items, a result that supports the view that contextualizing the interpretation of a given 
linguistic expression e is realized by building up an enriched CS representation on the 
basis of SF (e).
1.3. SF vs. CS – an illustration from everyday life
To round off the picture outlined so far, we illustrate the features listed in (2)–(5) in favor 
of the SF vs. CS distinction by an example we are well acquainted with, viz. the repre-
sentations involved in handling numbers, number symbols, and numerals in everyday 
life. Note that each of the semiotic objects in (6)–(8) below represents in some way the 
numerical concept »18«. However, how numerical concepts between »10« and »20« are 
stored, activated, and operated on in our memory is poorly understood as yet, so the 
details regarding the claim in (5) must be left open. Suffi ce it to agree that »18« stands 
for the concept we make use of, say, in trying to mentally add up the sum to be paid 
for our purchases in the shopping trolley. With this proviso in mind, we now look at the 
representations of the concept »18« in (6)–(8) to fi nd out their interrelations.
(6) a. |||| |||| |||| |||
 b. :::  :::  :::
(7) a. XVIII    a'.  IIXX  (rarely occurring alternative)
 b. 18
(8) a. eighteen, achtzehn (8 + 10) English, German
 b. dix-huit, shi ba (10 + 8) French, Mandarin
 c. okto-kai-deka ((8)-and-(10)) Greek
 d. diez y ocho ((10)-and-(8)) Spanish
 e. vosem-na-dcat' ((8)-on-(10)) Russian
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 f. duo-de-viginti ((2)-of-(20)) Latin
 g. ocht-deec (8 + (2 × 5)) Irish
 h. deu-naw  (2 × 9) Welsh
(6) shows two iconic non-verbal representations of a quantity whose correlation with the 
concept »18« and/or with the numerals in (8) rests on the ability to count and the avail-
ability of numerals. The tallying systems in (6) are simple but ineffi cient for doing arith-
metic and hence hardly suitable to serve as semantic representations of the numerals in 
(8).
(7) shows two symbolic non-verbal representations of »18«, generated by distinct 
writing systems for numbers. The Roman number symbols are partially iconic in that 
they encode addition by iterating up to three special symbols for one, ten, hundred, or 
thousand, partially symbolic due to placing the symbol of a small number in front of the 
symbol of a larger number, thus indicating subtraction, cf. (7a, a'). The lack of a symbol 
for null prevented the creation of a positional system, the lack of means to indicate mul-
tiplication or division impeded calculation. Both were obstacles to progress in math-
ematics. Thus, Roman number symbols may roughly render the lexical meaning of (8a–f) 
but not those of (8g–h) and all other variants involving multiplication or division.
The Indo-Arabic system of number symbols exemplifi ed by 18 in (7b) is a positional 
system without labels based on exponents of ten (100, 101, 102, … , 10n). As a representa-
tional system for numbers it is recursive and potentially infi nite in yielding unambiguous 
and well-distinguished chains of symbols as output. Thus, knowing the system implies 
knowing that 18 ≠ 81 or that 17 and 19 are the direct predecessor and successor of 18, 
respectively, even if we do not have pertinent number words at our disposal to name 
them. Moreover, it is this representation of numbers that we use when we do arithmetic 
with paper and pencil or by pressing the keys of an electronic calculator. Enriched with 
auxiliary symbols for arithmetical operations and for marking their scope of application, 
as well as furnished with conventions for writing equations etc., this notational system is 
a well-defi ned means to reduce the use of mathematical expressions to representations 
of their Conceptual Structures, that is, to the CS representations they denote, indepen-
dent of any natural language in which these expressions may be read aloud or dictated. 
Let’s call this enriched system of Indo-Arabic number symbols the “CS system of 
mathematical expressions”. Now, what about the SF representations of numerals?
Though all number words in (8) denote the concept »18«, it is obvious that their 
lexical meanings differ in the way they are composed, cf. the second column in (8). As 
regards their combinatorial category, the number words in (8) are neither determina-
tive nor copulative compounds, nor are they conjoined phrases. They are perhaps best 
categorized as juxtapositions with or without connectives, cf. (8c–f) and (8a–b, g–h), 
respectively. The unique feature of complex number words is that the relations between 
their numeral constituents are nothing but encoded fundamental arithmetic operations 
(addition and multiplication are preferred; division and subtraction are less frequent). 
Thus, the second column in (8) shows SF representations of the number words in the 
fi rst column couched in terms of the CS system of mathematical expressions. The latter 
are construable as functor-argument structures with arithmetic operators (‘+’, ‘–’, ‘×’ 
etc.) as functors, quantity constants for digits as arguments, and parentheses (…) as 
boundaries marking lexical building blocks. Now let’s see what all this tells us about the 
distinctions in (2)–(5) above.
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The subset – set relation SF ⊂ CS mentioned in connection with (2) also holds for 
the number symbols in (7b). The CS system of mathematical expressions is capable of 
representing all partitions of 18 that draw on fundamental arithmetic operations. Based 
on this, the CS system at stake covers the internal structures of complex number words, 
cf. (8), as well as those of equations at the sentence level like 18 = 3 × 6; 18 = 2 × 9; 18 = 
72 : 4 etc.
By contrast, the subset of SF representations for numerals is restricted in two respects. 
First, not all admissible partitions of a complex number like 18 are designated as SF of 
a complex numeral lexicalized to denote »18«. The grammar of number words in L is 
interspersed with (certain types of) L-specifi c packing strategies, cf. Hurford (1975), 
Greenberg (1978). Second, since the ideal relationship between systems of number 
symbols and systems of numerals is a one-to-one correspondence, the non-ambiguity 
required of the output of numeral systems practically forbids creation or use of synony-
mous number names (except for the distinct numerals used for e.g. 1995 when speaking 
of years or of prices in €).
There is still another conclusion to be drawn from (6)–(8) in connection with (2). The 
CS system of mathematical expressions is a purposeful artifact created and developed to 
solve the “homogenization problem” raised by CS representations for the well-defi ned 
fi eld of numbers and arithmetic operations on them. First, the mental operations of 
counting, adding, multiplying etc., which the system is designed to represent, have been 
abstracted from practical actions, viz. from lining up things, bundling up things, bundling 
up bundles of things etc. Second, the CS representations of mathematical expressions 
provided by the system are unambiguous, complete (that is, fully specifi ed and containing 
neither gaps nor variables to be instantiated by elements from outside the system), and 
independent of the particular languages in which they may be verbalized.
The lexicon-based packaging and contents of the components of SF representations 
claimed in (3) and (4) are also corroborated by (6)–(8). The fi rst point to note is the L-
specifi c ways in which (i) numerals are categorized in morpho-syntactic terms and (ii) their 
lexical meanings are composed. The second point is this: Complex numerals differ from 
regular (determinative or copulative) compounds in that the relations between their con-
stituents are construed as encodings of fundamental arithmetical operations, cf. (8a–h). 
This unique feature of the subgrammar of number words also yields a strong argument wrt. 
the “justifi cation problem” posed by the assumption of lexicon-based SF representations.
The claims in (3) and (4) concerning the non-linguistic nature of CS representations 
are supported by the fact that e.g. 18 is an intermodally valid representation of the con-
cept »18« as it covers both the perception-based iconic representations of »18« in (6) and 
the lexicon-based linguistic expressions denoting »18« in (8). Thus, the unique advantage 
of the CS system of mathematical expressions is founded on the representational inter-
modality and the conceptual homogeneity it has achieved in the history of mathematical 
thinking. No other science is more dependent on the representations of its subject than 
mathematics.
Revealing as this illustration may be, the insights it yields cannot simply be extended 
to the lexicon and grammar of a natural language L beyond the subgrammar of number 
words. The correlations between systems of number names and their SF representations 
in terms of the CS system of mathematical expressions form a special case which results 
from the creation of a non-linguistic semiotic artifact, viz. a system to represent number 
concepts under controlled laboratory conditions. The meanings, the combinatorial 
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potential and hence the SF representations of lexical items outside the domain of numeric 
tools are far less strictly codifi ed than those of numerals. Otherwise, the controversial 
issues listed in (1) would not emerge. The overwhelming majority of SF representations 
of lexical items have to account for ambiguity, polysemy, underspecifi cation, context-
dependency etc., that is, for phenomena which require the use of appropriate variables at 
the SF level to be instantiated by pieces of information available at the CS level.
1.4. Aims and limitations
Having outlined some perspectives and problems connected with the assumption of two 
separate but interacting levels of semantic representation, we conclude this introductory 
survey by some remarks on the weight one may attach to the pros and cons discussed so 
far.
First, regarding the justifi cation problem raised by (3) there is a truism: the represen-
tations assigned to linguistic meaning depend on the meaning attributed to linguistic 
representations. In other words, in view of our limited knowledge of the principles based 
on which linguistic expressions and semantic interpretations are mutually assigned, we 
cannot get along without auxiliary terminology such as tier, layer, plane, domain etc. Thus, 
the term level of representation is just a heuristic aid that serves as a gathering place for 
distinctions considered to be necessary and worth systematizing. Any further assessment 
is premature.
Second, the crucial point is not the number of levels of linguistic structure formation 
we postulate but the validity of the arguments based on which such levels are substanti-
ated. It is above all this guideline that characterizes the efforts subsumable under the 
label Two-level Semantics. There have been proposals to increase the number of levels, 
cf. Dölling (2001, 2003, 2005a); Schwarz (1992), as well as criticisms regarding the mapping 
operations assumed to apply between SF and CS, cf. Blutner (1995, 1998, 2004), Meyer 
(1994), Taylor (1994, 1995). Given the situation defi ned by the questions in (1), Two-level 
Semantics may be considered a series of attempts along the lines of (2)–(5) to achieve a 
more fi ne-grained picture of what we are used to calling “semantic interpretation”. These 
attempts were, and still are, driven and guided by the following leitmotif:
(9)  The semantic interpretation of a sentence s in isolation as well as of its utterance 
in use require to differentiate and interrelate those portions of its meaning that are 
lexicon-based and those possibly available portions of meaning that are context-
based such that the latter may serve as specifi cations of the former.
Third, in view of the fact that lexical SF representations are discussed in detail by 
M. Bierwisch (article 16), we will pay more attention to compositionality issues (§3) and 
CS representations and the way they account both for the semantic issues pointed out 
in (1) and for the various problems raised in connection with the distinctions in (2)–(5) 
above (§4).
Fourth, Two-level Semantics shares several objectives with the framework presented 
in article 30 (Jackendoff) Conceptual Semantics but prefers different solutions. There 
is agreement on the guiding role of compositionality and the need for decomposition. 
Jackendoff’s requirement that “Utterance meanings must serve as a formal basis for 
31. Two-level Semantics: Semantic Form and Conceptual Structure 717
inference” (Jackendoff, this volume, p. 691) is accepted as contextualized inferencing at 
the CS level but in addition there are built-in inferences at the SF level. The two-level 
framework acknowledges the import of categorization and contextualization but places 
emphasis on the grammatical nature of SF as indicated in (3) and (4) above. On this 
view, the principles governing SF representations concern not only the internal meaning 
structure and the grammatical packaging of lexical items but also general conditions on 
the lexical system of L, e.g. grammatical categories, lexicalization patterns, options to be 
chosen as the basis of agreement etc. By way of illustration, note the following.
The English collective noun (i) married couple has two equivalents in German: 
(ii) Ehepaar, which is also a collective noun, and (iii) Eheleute, which, though based on a 
plural only noun, behaves like a regular individual plural and has no direct counterpart 
in English; cf. Dölling (1994), Lang (1994). Now, while all three are absolutely alike at 
the CS level in denoting a set of two individuals as husband and wife, they differ at the 
SF level in the way they are sensitive to number agreement and selectional restrictions, 
cf. (10–13):
(10) a. Die Eheleute hassen [3P.Pl] einander/sich gegenseitig.
 b. Das Ehepaar hasst [3P.Sg] *einander/*sich gegenseitig.
 c. Das Ehepaar *ist/*sind [3P.Sg/Pl] beide Linkshänder.
 d. Die Eheleute sind [3P.Pl] beide Linkshänder.
(11) a.  The married couple hate [3P.Pl] each other/are [3P.Pl] both left-handers.
 b. Each one of the married couple hates [3P.Sg] the other.
(12) a. The married couple is [3P.Sg] waiting for their visa.
 b. The married couple are [3P.Pl] waiting for their visas.
(13) a. Das Ehepaar
i





 b. Die Eheleute
i
 warten [3P.Pl] auf ihre
i
 Visa.
The antecedent of reciprocals like einander or each other must denote a set of two (or 
more) elements. In both languages, the antecedent is usually a plural NP or an and-
coordination of NPs; with collective nouns, however, there are language-particular con-
straints. In German, agreement features for person, number, and gender are assigned on 
the basis of some morpho-syntactic correspondence between antecedent and target. A 
singular collective noun as subject requires a verb in the singular and excludes recipro-
cals like einander as complement, cf. (10b,c; 13a), whereas plural NPs or and-coordinated 
NPs as subjects usually come with plural verbs and allow for reciprocals as complements, 
cf. (10a,d; 13b). In British English, however, committee-type singular nouns as subjects 
may spread agreement features on a morpho-syntactic or on a semantic basis, cf. (11a,b; 
12a,b). Cases of singular agreement like (12a) are conceptualized as referring to a single 
entity, cases of plural override like (12b) are conceptualized as referring to the indi-
vidual members of the set. What is an option in English is an obligatory lexical choice in 
German. As lexical items, English singular collective nouns are unspecifi ed for inducing 
morpho-syntactic or semantic agreement and for co-occurring with reciprocals, German 
singular collective nouns, however, are basically unavailable for plural agreement and/
or reciprocals since number agreement in German strictly operates on morpho-syntactic 
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matching. In sum, although having the same SF, the collective nouns married couple and 
Ehepaar differ in their impact on sentence formation.
Moreover, since SF forms a constitutive part of L as a natural language, it is subject to 
a series of pragmatic-based felicity conditions on communication. None of these aspects 
of SF as a linguistic level applies to CS representations.
The article attempts to show that the distinction of SF vs. CS representations may 
turn out to be a useful heuristic means in dealing with the issues listed in (1) as well as 
a promising research strategy to connect semantic theorizing with empirical methods of 
analyzing semantic processing along the lines of (5). Guided by the leitmotif in (9), §2 
deals with some unsolved problems of polysemy. §3 explores the SF vs. CS distinction 
from the angle of compositionality, and in §4 we turn to contextualization by discuss-
ing case studies of variables in SF representations and their instantiation at the CS 




Meaning multiplicity on the lexical level comprises three basic types: homonymy, pol-
ysemy, and indeterminacy (or vagueness). Bierwisch (1983), in a way the birth certifi -
cate of the SF vs. CS distinction, draws on institution nouns such as school, university, 
museum, parliament etc. to illustrate systematic polysemy, that is, a lexical item with one 
meaning representation acquiring further representations that differ from the fi rst in 
predictable ways based on conceptual relations. (14a–d) below shows some of the read-
ings that school may assume. The readings are numbered and the concepts they represent 
are added in ITALICIZED CAPS. normal caps in (15) show the invariant SF representation 
for the lexeme school, which may be contextually specifi ed at the CS level by applying 
certain functions to (15) that eventually yield the utterance meanings of (14a–d) as rep-
resented in (16a–d).
(14) a. The school made a major donation. school
1 
⊂ INSTITUTION
 b. The school has a fl at roof. school
2
 ⊂ BUILDING
 c. He enjoys school very much. school
3 
⊂ PROCESS
 d. The school took a staff outing. school
4 
⊂ PERSONNEL
(15) SF(school) = λX [purpose X W]
 with W = processes_of_learning_and_teaching
(16) a. λX [INSTITUTION X & SF (school)]
 b. λX [BUILDING X & SF (school)]
 c. λX [PROCESS X & SF (school)]
 d. λX [PERSONNEL X & SF (school)]
Taken together, (14)–(16) show a way of (i) keeping the lexical meaning of the lexeme 
school constant and avoiding problematic ambiguity assumptions and (ii) still accounting 
for the range of semantic variation the lexeme school may cover at the CS level. The 
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conceptual interpretations of school in (16) are determined by selectional restrictions, 
cf. (14a–d), and come with distinctive grammatical features: so e.g. school in the PROCESS 
reading has no regular plural and in German the prepositions in Max geht auf die/in die/
zur Goethe-Schule clearly select the INSTITUTION, BUILDING and PROCESS reading, respec-
tively. So far, so good. Methodologically, however, the analysis of these institution nouns 
poses some problems.
First of all, we do not have reliable principles yet to fi nd the SF of a polysemous 
lexeme, which makes it diffi cult to motivate a collection of templates that would account 
for the specifi cations in (16). Moreover, it is unclear (i) whether the members of the 
concept family associated with the noun school all draw on the abstract SF the same way 
(as suggested by (15–16)) or (ii) whether some of the concepts are more closely intercon-
nected than others. Finally, it is unclear what conceptual (sub-)system is taken to serve as 
the source for the specifi cations in (16). To show the importance of these issues and their 
impact on the SF vs. CS distinction some brief comments might be in order.
The SF proposed in (15) takes school as a sort of artifact by drawing on the fea-
ture purpose X W, which is not implausible as it inheres in all artifact-denoting nouns. 
However, (15) ignores the social relevance attributed to the purpose W = processes_of_
learning_ and_teaching or to the purposes W', W" of other institution nouns. Actually, 
what makes a created X into an institution is its social importance evidenced by the fact 
that some purpose Wi has been institutionalized by founding or keeping X. Therefore, 
instead of reducing the role of this feature common to all institution nouns to that of 
yielding a concept at the CS level, cf. INSTITUTION in (16a), the lexical semantics of these 
nouns should make use of it as an invariant component at the SF level. Heuristically, the 
starting point for construing the SF of school and the CS specifi cations in (16) might be 
the lexical meaning of institution, which is something like ‘a legal entity that organizes 
purposeful events to be performed and/or received by authorized groups of persons in 
specifi c locations’ such that it (i) also covers abstract instances like the institution of mar-
riage and (ii) provides the basis for (16a–d) as metonymy-based conceptual shifts. The 
learned word institution, no doubt an element of the adult lexicon, has a lexical meaning 
that is suffi ciently abstract to allow for each and every of the conceptual specifi cations of 
school in (16); its conceptual basis is a sort of world knowledge that rests on what may 
be called “created advanced level concepts”, which in turn defi ne a widely unexplored 
domain of the conceptual system.
In contrast, the conceptual subsystem of spatial orientation is a domain we know a bit 
more about, as it crucially draws on human perception and thus on “natural basic level 
concepts”. So it is not a surprise that a number of pioneering works in the realm of con-
ceptual structure deal with spatial issues. Since these studies provide better illustrations 
of the SF vs. CS distinction, we will focus on them in the next sections.
Another problem with this approach to systematic polysemy is the fact that, despite 
their ontological and/or categorial differences, the conceptual specifi cations of the 
SF (school) in (16a–d) are not absolutely incompatible but may occur in certain 
combinations, cf. the gradual acceptability of the examples in (17):
(17) a. The school which has a fl at roof made a major donation.
 b. ?? The school, which has a fl at roof, made a major donation.
 c. ?? The school, which has a fl at roof, went out for a staff outing.
 d. The school has a fl at roof and *it/the school went out for a staff outing.
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Whereas the INSTITUTION and the BUILDING readings are somewhat compatible, the 
BUILDING and the PERSONNEL readings are not; as regards the (type of) reading of the 
antecedent, anaphoric pronouns are less tolerant than relative pronouns or repeated 
DPs. The data in (17) show that the conceptual specifi cations of SF (school) differ in ways 
that are poorly understood as yet; cf. Asher (2007) for some discussion. The semantics of 
institution nouns, for a while the signature tune of Two-level Semantics, elicited a certain 
amount of discussion and criticism, cf. Herzog & Rollinger (1991), Bierwisch & Bosch 
(1995). The problems expounded in these volumes are still unsolved but they sharpened 
our view of the intricacies of the SF vs. CS distinction.
2.2. Locative prepositions
In many languages the core inventory of adpositions encode spatial relations to localize 
some x (called theme, fi gure or located object) wrt. the place occupied by some y (called 
relatum, ground or reference object), where x and y may pairwise range over objects, sub-
stances, and events. Regarding the conceptual basis of these relations, locative preposi-
tions in English and related languages are usually subdivided into topological (in, at, on), 
directional (into, onto), dimensional (above, under, behind), and path-defi ning (along, 
around) prepositions. The semantic problems posed by these lexical items can be best 
illustrated with in, which supposedly draws on spatial containment, pure and simple, and 
which is therefore taken to be the prime example of a topological preposition.
To illustrate how SF (in) is integrated into a lexical entry with information on Pho-
netic Form (PF), Grammatical Features (GF), Argument Structure (AS) etc., we take 
German in as a telling example: It renders English in vs. into with distinct cases which 
in turn correspond to the values of the feature [ Dir(ectional)] subcategorizing the 
internal argument y, and to further syntactic distinctions. The entry in (18) is taken from 
Bierwisch (1988: 37), examples are added in (19). The interdependence of the values for 
the case feature [ Obl(ique)] and for the category feature [ Dir] is indicated by means 
of the meta-variable  ∈ {+, –} and by the conventions (i) –  inverts the value of  and 
(ii) (W) means that W is present if  = + and absent if  = –.
(18) Lexical entry of the German preposition in:
 
}}PF
/in/; [–V,–N,  Dir]; y x
[–   Obl]
[(fin) [loc x] ⊂ [loc y]]
GF AS SF} }
(19) a.  Die Straße/Fahrt  führt in die Stadt. [+ Dir, – Obl] = Acc,  “x is a path ending 
in y”
  The street/journey leads into the city.
  
/in/; [–V,–N, Dir]; y x
[– Obl]
[(fin) [loc x] ⊂ [loc y]]
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 b.  Die Straße/Fahrt    ist in der Stadt. [– Dir, + Obl] = Dat, “x is located in y”
  The street/journey is in the city.
  
/in/; [–V,–N, Dir]; y x
[+ Obl]
[[loc x] ⊂ [loc y]]
Now let’s take a closer look at the components of SF. The variables x and y represent 
entities ranging over the domains of objects, substances, or events. loc is a SF functor-
constant of category N/N such that loc x assigns x the place it occupies in the domain it 
is an element of. The SF constant fi n yields the fi nal part of [loc x], thereby transforming 
the external argument of in into a path. The SF-constant ⊂ “specifi es a particular rela-
tion between places, in the case of in simply (improper) inclusion” (Bierwisch 1988: 34). 
Confi ning our review to objects, the SF of in assigned to (19b) might thus be paraphrased 
as “the place occupied by the street x is (improperly) included in the place occupied by 
the city y” (op. cit.).
While it is widely accepted that the semantics of locative in should be based on spatial 
inclusion, the relativizing attribute “(improper)” in the explication of the SF-constant 
⊂ quoted above is indicative of a hidden controversial issue. In fact, much ink has been 
spilled on the problem of how to determine the lexical meaning of in by keeping to the 
spatial inclusion approach. The discussion was ignited by groups of data that seem to 
challenge the [[loc x] ⊂ [loc y]] analysis of the preposition in in some way.
(20) a. The amount of oxygen in the air is diminishing.
 b. The balloons in the air quickly escaped.
 c. The air in the balloons quickly escaped.
(21) a. The water in the vase should be replaced.
 b. The fl owers in the vase are wilted.
 c. The cracks in the vase cannot be repaired.
 d. I did not notice the splinter in his hand.
Whereas the approach under review might capture the examples in (20) by letting x and 
y range over substances (a) or objects and substances (b, c), the differences of (20a vs. b) 
and of (20b vs. c) in the interpretation of loc and ⊂ remain out of its reach. Obviously, 
(20a–c) differ in the way the place is assigned to x and to y by loc, but are alike in clearly 
requiring that ⊂ has to be interpreted as proper inclusion. The examples in (21) show 
that the place assigned to the relatum by the functor loc is not confi ned to the material 
boundaries of the object y but may vary to some extent. In (21a–c) the interpretation of 
in the vase involves function-based enrichment, e.g. by means of gestalt-psychological 
laws of closure, to account for the containment relation between x and y, which is proper 
in (21a), partial in (21b), and privative in (21c). The PP in (21d) is ambiguous, i.e. unspeci-
fi ed wrt. “x being materially included in y (as a foreign body)” or “x being functionally 
included in a cupped y (to prevent x from getting lost)”.
The discussion of such data produced a series of theoretical revisions of the semantic 
analysis of topological prepositions. Wunderlich & Herweg (1991) propose (22) as a 
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general schema for the SF of locative prepositions thereby abandoning the problematic 
functor ⊂ and revising the functor loc:
(22) λy λx (loc (x, prep*(y) )),
  where loc localizes the object x in the region determined by the preposition p and 
prep* is a variable ranging over p-based regions.
Bierwisch (1996: 69) replaces SF (in) in (18) with λy λx [x [loc [int y]]] commenting “x 
loc p identifi es the condition that the location of x be (improperly) included in p” and 
“int y identifi es a location determined by the boundaries of y, that is, the interior of y”. 
Although this proposal avoids some of the problems with the functor ⊂, the puzzling 
effect of “(improperly) included” remains and so does the defi nition of int y as yielding 
“the interior of x”.
Herweg (1989) advocates an abstract SF (in) which draws on proper spatial inclusion 
such that the examples in (21) are semantically marked due to violating the “Presupposi-
tion of Argument Homogeneity”. The resulting truth value gap triggers certain function-
based accommodations at the CS level that account for the interpretations of (21a–d).
Hottenroth (1991), in a detailed analysis of French dans, rejects the idea that SF 
(dans) might draw on imprecise region-creating constants like int y. Instead, SF (dans) 
should encode the conditions on the relatum in prototypical uses of dans. The standard 
reference region of dans is a three-dimensional empty closed container (bottle, bag, box 
etc.). If the relatum of dans does not meet one or more of these characteristics, the refer-
ence region is conceptually adapted by means of certain processing principles (laws of 
closure, mental demarcation of unbounded y, conceptual switching from 3D to 2D etc.).
In view of data like those in (21), Carstensen (2001) proposes to do away with the 
region account altogether and to replace it with a perception-based account of preposi-
tions that draws on the conceptual representation of changes of focused spatial attention.
To sum up, the brief survey of developments in the semantic analysis of preposi-
tions may also be taken as proof of the heuristic productivity emanating from the SF vs. 
CS distinction. Among polysemous verbs, the verb to open has gained much attention, 
cf. Bierwisch (article 16). Based on a French-German comparison, Schwarze & 
Schepping (1995) discuss what type of polysemy is to be accounted for at which of 
the two levels. Functional categories (determiners, complementizers, connectives etc.), 
whose lexical meanings lack any support in perception and are hence purely operative, 
have seldom been analyzed in terms of the SF vs. CS distinction so far; but cf. Lang 
(2004) for an analysis that accounts for the abstract meanings of and, but etc. and their 
contextual specifi cation by inferences drawn from the structural context, the discourse 
context, and/or from world knowledge. Clearly, the ‘poorer’ the lexical meaning of such a 
synsemantic lexical item, the more will its semantic contribution need to be enriched by 
means of contextualization.
3.  Compositionality and beyond: Semantic underspecifi cation
and coercion
Two-level Semantics was fi rst mainly concerned with polysemy problems of the kind 
illustrated in the previous section. Emphasis was laid on developing an adequate theory 
31. Two-level Semantics: Semantic Form and Conceptual Structure 723
of lexical semantics that would be able to deal properly and on systematic grounds with 
the distinction of word knowledge and world knowledge. A major tenet of Two-level 
Semantics as a lexicon-based theory of natural language meaning is that the internal 
decompositional structure of lexical items determines their external combinatorial prop-
erties, that is, their external syntactic behavior. This is why compositionality issues are of 
eminent interest to Two-level Semantics; cf. (1a).
There is wide agreement among semanticists that, given the combinatorial nature 
of linguistic meaning, some version of the principle of compositionality – as formu-
lated, e.g., in (23) – must certainly hold. But in view of the complexity and richness of 
natural language meaning, there is also consensus that compositional semantics is 
faced with a series of challenges and problems; see article 6 (Pagin & Westerståhl) 
Compositionality.
(23) Principle of compositionality:
  The meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its parts and 
the way they are syntactically combined.
Rather than weakening the principle of compositionality or abandoning it altogether, 
Two-level Semantics seeks to cope with the compositionality challenge by confi ning 
compositionality to the level of Semantic Form. That is, SF is understood as comprising 
exactly those parts of natural language meaning that are (i) context-independent and 
(ii) compositional, in the sense that they are built in parallel with syntactic structure. 
This leaves space to integrate non-compositional aspects of meaning constitution at the 
level of Conceptual Structure. In particular, the mapping of SF-representations onto CS-
representations may include non-local contextual information and thereby qualify as 
non-compositional. Of course, the operations at the CS level as well as the SF – CS map-
ping operations are also combinatorial and can therefore be said to be compositional in 
a broader sense. Yet their combinatorics is not bound to mirror the syntactic structure 
of the given linguistic expression and thus does not qualify as compositional in a strict 
sense. This substantiates the assumption of two distinct levels of meaning representation 
as discussed in §1. Thus, Two-level Semantics’ account of the richness and fl exibility of 
natural language meaning constitution consists in assuming a division of labor between 
a rather abstract, context-independent and strictly compositionally determined SF and a 
contextually enriched CS that also includes non-compositionally derived meaning com-
ponents. Various solutions have been proposed for implementing this general view of 
the SF vs. CS distinction. These differ mainly in (a) the syntactic fi ne-tuning of the com-
positional operations and the abstractness of the corresponding SF-representations, and 
in (b) the way of handling non-compositional meaning aspects in terms of, e.g., coercion 
operations. These issues will be discussed in turn.
3.1. Combinatory meaning variation
Assumptions concerning the spell-out of the specifi c mechanisms of compositionality 
are generally guided by parsimony. That is, the fewer semantic operations warranting 
compositionality are postulated, the better. On this view, it would be attractive to 
have a single semantic operation, presumably functional application, fi guring as the 
semantic counterpart to syntactic binary branching. An illustration is given in (24): 
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Given the lexical entries for the locative preposition in and the proper noun Berlin 
in (24a) and (24b) respectively, functional application of the preposition to its internal 
argument yields (24c) as the compositional result corresponding to the semantics of 
the PP.
(24) a. in: λy λx (loc (x, in*(y)))





 Berlin]]:  λy λx (loc (x, in*(y))) (berlin)
    ≡ λx (loc (x, in*(berlin)))
Functional application is suitable for syntactic head-complement relationships as it 
reveals a correspondence between the syntactic head-non-head relationship and the 
semantic functor-argument relationship. In (24c), for instance, the preposition in is 
both the syntactic head of the PP and the semantic functor, which takes the DP as its 
argument. Syntactic adjuncts, on the other hand, cannot be properly accounted for by 
functional application as they lack a comparable syntax-semantics correspondence. In 
syntactic head-adjunct confi gurations the semantic functor, if any, is not the syntactic 
head but the non-head; for an overview of the different solutions that have been put 
forth to cope with this syntax-semantics imbalance see article 54 (Maienborn & Schäfer) 
Adverbs and adverbials. Different scholars working in different formal frameworks have 
suggested remarkably convergent solutions, according to which the relevant semantic 
operation applying to syntactic head-adjunct confi gurations is predicate conjunction. 
This might be formulated, for instance, in terms of a modifi cation template MOD as 
given in (25); cf., e.g. Higginbotham’s (1985) notion of θ -identifi cation, Bierwisch’s (1997) 
adjunction schema, Wunderlich’s (1997b) argument sharing, or the composition rule of 
predicate modifi cation in Heim & Kratzer (1998).
(25) Modifi cation template MOD:
 MOD: λQ λP λx (P(x) & Q(x))
The template MOD takes a modifi er and an expression to be modifi ed (= modifyee) and 
turns it into a conjunction of predicates. More specifi cally, an (intersective) modifi er adds 
a predicate that is linked up to the referential argument of the expression to be modifi ed. 
In (26) and (27) illustrations are given for nominal modifi cation and verbal modifi cation, 
respectively. In (26), the semantic contribution of the modifi er is added as an additional 
predicate of the noun’s referential argument. In (27), the modifi er provides an additional 
predicate of the verb’s eventuality argument.
(26) a. house: λz (house (z))
 b. [
PP








  λQ λP λx (P(x) & Q(x)) (λz (house (z))) (λu (loc (u, in*(berlin))))
  ≡ λx (house (x) & loc (x, in*(berlin)))
(27) a. sleep: λz λe (sleep (e) & agent (e, z))
 b. [
PP
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   λQ λP λx (P(x) & Q(x))(λz λe (sleep (e) & agent (e, z)))(λu (loc (u, in*(berlin))))
  ≡ λz λe (sleep (e) & agent (e, z) & loc (e, in*(berlin)))
The semantic template MOD thus provides the compositional semantic counterpart to 
syntactic head-adjunct confi gurations. There are good reasons to assume that, besides 
functional application, some version of MOD is required when it comes to spelling out 
the basic mechanisms of compositionality.
The template MOD in (25) captures a very fundamental insight about the compo-
sitional contribution of intersective modifi ers. Nevertheless, scholars working within 
the Two-level Semantics paradigm have emphasized that a modifi cation analysis along 
the lines of MOD fails to cover the whole range of intersective modifi cation; cf., e.g., 
Maienborn (2001, 2003) for locative adverbials, Dölling (2003) for adverbial modifi ers 
in general, Bücking (2009, 2010) for nominal modifi ers. Modifi ers appear to be more 
fl exible in choosing their compositional target, both in the verbal domain and in the 
nominal domain. Besides supplying an additional predicate of the modifyee’s referential 
argument, as in (26) and (27), modifi ers may also relate less directly to their host argu-
ment. Some illustrations are given in (28)–(30). (For the sake of simplicity the data are 
presented in English.)
(28) a. The cook prepared the chicken in a Marihuana sauce. (cf. Maienborn 2003)
 b. The bank robbers escaped on bicycles.
 c. Paul tic kled Maria on her neck.
(29) a. Anna dressed Max’s hair unobtrusively. (cf. Dölling 2003: 530)
 b. Ede reached the summit in two days. (cf. Dölling 2003: 516)
(30) a. the fast processing of the data (cf. Bücking 2009: 94)
 b. the preparation of the chicken in a pepper sauce (cf. Bücking 2009: 102)
 c. Georg’s querying of the men (cf. Bücking 2010: 51)
The locative modifi ers in (28) differ from the general MOD pattern as illustrated in (27) 
in that they do not locate the whole event but only one of its integral parts. For instance, 
in (28b) it’s not the escape that is located on bicycles but – according to the preferred 
reading – the agent of this event, viz. the bank robbers. In the case of (28c), the linguistic 
structure does not even tell us what is located on Maria’s neck. It could be Paul’s hand 
but also, e.g., a feather he used for tickling Maria. Maienborn (2001, 2003) calls these 
modifi ers “event internal modifi ers” and sets them apart from “event external modifi ers” 
such as in (27), which serve to holistically locate the verb’s eventuality argument.
Similar observations are made by Dölling (2003) wrt. cases like (29). Sentence (29a) 
is ambiguous. It might be interpreted as expressing that Anna performed the event of 
dressing Max’s hair in an unobtrusive manner. This is what the application of MOD 
would result in. But (29a) has another reading, according to which it is not the event of 
hair dressing that is unobtrusive but Max’s resulting hair-style. Once again, the modifi er’s 
contribution does not apply directly to the verb’s eventuality argument but to some ref-
erent related to it. The same holds true for (29b), where the temporal adverbial cannot 
relate to the punctual event of Ede reaching the summit but only to its preparatory 
phase.
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Finally, Bücking (2009, 2010) discusses a series of cases in the nominal domain which 
also show a less direct relationship between the modifi er and its host argument than 
the one established by MOD; cf. (25). The modifi er fast in (30a), for instance, may be 
interpreted event-externally, expressing that the overall duration of the processing was 
short. But (30a) also has an event-internal interpretation, according to which the sub-
events of processing the data were performed in a fast manner (whereas the whole pro-
cessing might have taken a long time). In a similar vein, Georg need not necessarily be 
the agent of the querying in (30c). Bücking argues that the prenominal genitive estab-
lishes a more indirect relationship to the nominal referent, such that a more abstract 
control relation between Georg and the query would suffi ce; cf. the one provided by 
the context in (31).
(31)  Georg wanted to know how mens’ buying behavior is infl uenced by the weather. He 
therefore instructed his research assistants to interview men under varying weather 
conditions. Georg’s querying of the men is still considered a milestone in consumer 
research. 
 (cf. Bücking 2010: 51)
The conclusion to be drawn from these and similar studies is that modifi ers show a 
remarkable fl exibility in relating to their compositionally determined host argument, 
thus giving rise to a wide spectrum of meaning variations.
Is there a way to treat this observation compositionally? The proposals developed 
by Bücking, Dölling and Maienborn basically amount to liberalizing MOD such that it 
may license the particular kind of semantic underspecifi cation observed above. That is, 
besides linking the semantic contribution of the modifi er directly to the verb’s or noun’s 
referential argument, as in (25), there should be a less direct variant that could be spelled 
out as in (32).
(32) Modifi cation template MOD’:
 MOD’: λQ λP λx (P(x) & R (x, v) & Q(v))
MOD’ introduces a free variable v that is linked to the modifyee’s referential argument 
x by means of a relational variable R. Both v and R are so-called SF-parameters, i.e. free 
variables that remain underspecifi ed at the level of SF and will only be instantiated at 
the level of CS. Applying MOD’ to a sentence such as (28c), repeated as (33), yields the 
following SF:
(33) Paul tickled Maria on her neck.
  SF:  ∃e (tickle (e) & agent (e, paul) & patient (e, maria) & R (e, v) & loc (v, 
on*(maria’s neck))
According to the SF in (33), an entity v which is involved in the tickling event is located 
on Maria’s neck. This is as far as the compositional semantics of event-internal modi-
fi ers takes us. The identifi cation of v and its exact role in e can only be spelled out at 
the CS level by taking into account contextually available world knowledge. This would 
include, e.g., knowledge about the spatial confi guration required for tickling, viz. contact, 
as well as knowledge about suitable and/or plausible instruments employed for tickling. 
A potential conceptual spell-out is given in (34); cf. Maienborn (2003: 490ff) for details.
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(34) Paul tickled Maria on her neck.
 SF:  ∃e (tickle (e) & agent (e, paul) & patient (e, maria) & R (e, v) & loc (v, 
on*(maria’s neck))
 CS:  ∃ex (tickle (e) & agent (e, paul) & patient (e, maria) & instr (e, x) & feather 
(x) & loc (x, on*(maria’s neck))
This conceptual spell-out provides a plausible utterance meaning for sentence (34). It 
goes beyond the compositionally determined meaning by exploiting our conceptual 
knowledge that tickling is performed with some instrument which needs to have spatial 
contact to the object being tickled. Consequently, the SF-parameter R can be identifi ed 
as the instrument relation, and the parameter v may be instantiated, e.g., by a feather. 
Although not manifest at the linguistic surface, such conceptually inferred units are plau-
sible potential instantiations of the compositionally introduced SF-parameter v. (Dölling 
and Maienborn use abduction as a formal means of deriving a contextually specifi ed CS 
from a semantically underspecifi ed SF; cf. Hobbs et al. (1993). We will come back to the 
SF-CS mapping in §4.)
Different proposals have been developed for implementing the notion of a more 
liberal and fl exible combinatorics, such as MOD’, into the compositional machinery. 
Maienborn (2001, 2003) argues that MOD’ is only licensed in particular structural envi-
ronments: Event-internal modifi ers have a base adjunction site in close proximity to the 
verb, whereas event-external adjuncts adjoin at VP-level. These distinct structural posi-
tions provide the key to a compositional account. Maienborn thus formulates a more 
fi ne-tuned syntax-semantics interface condition that subsumes MOD and MOD’ under 
a single compositional rule MOD*.
(35) Modifi cation template MOD*:
 MOD*:  λQ λP λx (P(x) & R (x, v) & Q(v))
  Condition on the application of MOD*: If MOD* is applied in a structural environ-
ment of categorial type X, then R = part-of, otherwise (i.e. in an XP-environment) 
R is the identity function.
If MOD* is applied in an XP-environment, then R is instantiated as identity, i.e. v is 
identifi ed with the referential argument of the modifi ed expression, thus yielding the 
standard variant MOD. If applied in an X-environment, R is instantiated as the part-
of relation, which pairs entities with their integral constituents. Thus, in Maienborn’s 
account the observed meaning variability is traced back to a grammatically constrained 
semantic indeterminacy that is characteristic of modifi cation.
Dölling (2003) takes a different track by assuming that the SF-parameter R is not rooted 
in modifi cation but is of a more general nature. Specifi cally, he suggests that R is introduced 
compositionally whenever a one-place predicate enters the composition. By this move, the 
SF of a complex expression is systematically extended by a series of SF-parameters, which 
guarantee that the application of any one-place predicate to its argument is systematically 
shifted to the conceptual level. On Dölling’s account, the SF of a complex linguistic expres-
sion is maximally abstract and underspecifi ed, with SF-parameters delineating possible 
(though not necessarily actual) sites of meaning variation.
Differences aside, the studies of Dölling, Maienborn and other scholars working 
in the Two-level Semantics paradigm emphasize that potential sources for semantic 
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indeterminacy are not only to be found in the lexicon but may also emerge in the course 
of composition, and they strive to model this combinatory meaning variation in terms of 
a rigid account of lexical and compositional semantics.
A key role in linking linguistic and extra-linguistic knowledge is taken by so-called 
SF-parameters. These are free variables that are installed under well-defi ned conditions 
at SF and are designed to be instantiated at the level of CS. SF-parameters are a means 
of triggering and controlling the conceptual enrichment of a grammatically determined 
meaning representation. They delineate precisely those gaps within the Semantic Form 
that call for conceptual specifi cation and they impose sortal restrictions on possible con-
ceptual fi llers. SF-parameters can thus be seen as well-defi ned windows through which 
compositional semantics allows linguistic expressions to access and constrain conceptual 
structures.
3.2. Non-compositional meaning adjustments
Conceptual specifi cation of a compositionally determined, underspecifi ed, abstract 
meaning skeleton, as illustrated in the previous section, is the core notion that character-
izes the Two-level Semantics perspective on the semantics-pragmatics interface. Its focus 
is on the conceptual exploitation of a linguistic expression’s regular meaning potential. A 
second focus typically pursued within Two-level Semantics concerns the possibilities of a 
conceptual solution of combinatory confl icts arising in the course of composition. These 
are combinatory adjustment operations by which a strictly speaking ill-formed linguistic 
expression gets an admissible yet irregular interpretation. In the literature such non-
compositional rescue operations are generally discussed under the label of “coercion”. 
An example is given in (36).
(36) The alarm clock stood intentionally on the table.
The sentence in (36) does not offer a regular integration for the subject-oriented adver-
bial intentionally, i.e, the subject NP the alarm clock does not fulfi ll the adverbial’s selec-
tional restriction for an intentional subject. Hence, a compositional clash results, and the 
sentence is ungrammatical. Nevertheless, although deviant, there seems to be a way to 
rescue the sentence so that it becomes acceptable and interpretable. In the case of (36), 
a possible repair strategy would be to introduce an actor who is responsible for the fact 
that the alarm clock stands on the table. This move would provide a suitable anchor 
for the adverbial’s semantic contribution. Thus, we understand (36) as saying that 
someone put the alarm clock on the table on purpose. That is, in case of a combinato-
rial clash, there seems to be a certain leeway for non-compositional adjustments of the 
compositionally derived meaning. The defective part is “coerced” into the right format.
Coercion phenomena are a topic of intensive research in current semantics. Up to 
now the primary focus has been on the widely ramifi ed notion of aspectual coercion 
(e.g. Moens & Steedman 1988; Pulman 1997; de Swart 1998; Dölling 2003, 2010; Egg 
2005) and on cases of so-called “complement coercion” as in Peter began the book (e.g. 
Pustejovsky 1995; Egg 2003; Asher 2007); see article 25 (de Swart) Mismatches and 
coercion for an overview. The framework of Two-level Semantics is particularly suited 
to investigate these borderline cases at the semantics-pragmatics interface because of its 
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comparatively strong assumptions and predictions about this interface in terms of SF- 
and CS-representations, and about the kind of knowledge available at each level. To give 
an example, one issue emphasized by Dölling (2010) is that it is not only grammatical 
confl icts that trigger coercion operations (as predominantly assumed in the literature), 
but that such operations may also be employed for solving confl icts or expectations that 
arise from world knowledge. If we take for instance a variant of sentence (36) such as 
(37), there is no immediate need for a non-compositional rescue operation anymore. The 
subject NP the children fulfi lls the adverbial’s selectional restriction for an intentional 
subject, hence, the sentence can be interpreted strictly compositionally with the children 
as intentional subjects. Nevertheless sentence (37) still has a second reading – viz. the 
only possible reading for (36) – according to which someone else, e.g. their teacher, put 
the children on the table on purpose.
(37) The children stood intentionally on the table. (2 readings)
Dölling (2010) draws the conclusion that rather than being borderline cases with 
somehow irregular interpretations, so-called coercion phenomena are just another 
instance of semantic underspecifi cation; cf. §3.1. Thus, he would propose to derive 
an abstract, underspecifi ed SF for both (36) and (37), and to defer its specifi cation to 
the level of CS. On the other hand, the following data are problematic for a radical 
underspecifi cation account such as Dölling’s.
(38) *The alarm clock stood voluntarily on the table.
(39) The children stood voluntarily on the table. (1 reading)
Sentence (38) is ungrammatical. There is no way of rescuing it along the lines of (36). 
Although from a conceptual perspective it would make equally good sense to interpret 
(38) as expressing that someone put the alarm clock voluntarily on the table, there is 
no such rescue option available. Apparently the linguistic system prevents such a resort. 
In the same vein, sentence (39) only has one reading, according to which it is the chil-
dren’s will to stand on the table but not that of another person. These observations 
suggest that the additional readings available for (36) and (37) are not fully regular 
interpretations but coerced ones. They show the need for scrutinizing on a much broader 
empirical basis the conspiracy of grammatical, conceptual and pragmatic factors that 
license and constrain the coercion phenomena; see also the different viewpoints on 
this issue put forward by Dölling (2005b), Rothstein (2005) and Maienborn (2005a,b). 
A comparatively new kind of evidence that might help clarify matters is provided by
psycholinguistic studies; see Pylkkänen & McElree (2006) for a state of the art report 
on coercion.
The short discussion of (36)–(39) gives a slight impression of the wide range of options 
currently tested in sharpening our understanding of the semantics-pragmatics interface 
and the implications they have for our assumptions about compositionality. The matter 
of how much grammar gets into meaning constitution and what else may join it to estab-
lish a full-fl edged utterance meaning of natural language expressions is still far from 
being settled.
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4. More on SF variables and their instantiation at the CS level
As pointed out in section 2.1, it was mainly the conceptual subsystem of spatial cognition 
that has stimulated pioneering investigations within Two-level Semantics. Therefore, it 
may be appropriate to report some of the analyses proposed in the realm of dimensional 
designation of spatial objects, cf. Bierwisch & Lang (1989a); Bierwisch (1996, 1997); 
Bierwisch & Schreuder (1992); Lang (1990, 1994, 2001); Lang, Carstensen & Simmons 
(1991). It is the complex interaction of two major grammatical modules, viz. gradation/
comparison and dimension assignment, which make facts and insights in this fi eld espe-
cially rewarding to semanticists. In order to discover the full range of relevant data, the 
basic assumption of Two-level Semantics (quoted at the outset of section 3), i.e. that the 
internal componential structure of lexical items determines their external combinato-
rial properties, has been converted into a heuristic guideline: Eliciting the combinatorics 
of dimension assignment (DA) terms for spatial objects by means of tasks like naming 
object extents or guessing objects by their dimensions etc. will reveal both the lexical 
meaning of each DA term and the structural pattern determining the lexical fi eld which 
the DA term is an element of.
4.1. Variables in SF representations of spatial dimension terms
In Bierwisch & Lang (1989a), SF representations of German and English dimensional 
adjectives are taken to be complex 3-place predicates. Their general format is shown in 
(40); the variables in (40) are distinguished by the type of operators that bind them.
(40) λc λx [quant [ dim x ] = [ v  c ]]
First, there are variables in argument places that are subject to λ-abstraction, λ-
conversion and other binding operations: (i) an object x that is assigned a dimension d, 
with d ∈ {dim} and dim being a metavariable on dimension assignment parameters, cf. 
(42) below; (ii) a difference value c which is added to (+), or subtracted from (–), the 
comparison value v.
Second, the variable v is a free variable which – depending on the respective structural 
context within the clause – may assume one of the following values: (iii) “0” if c contains 
a Measure Phrase or “norm of the class which x belongs to” if dim is an AP in the positive 
without complement or “content of the comparative phrase” if dim is part of a comparative 
construction. The admissible specifi cations of the comparison value v are subject to some 
general conditions which are motivated by CS but have been formulated as conditions 
on well-formed SF representations; for details justifying that solution, cf. Bierwisch &
Lang (1989b).
The operator quant is an SF functor constant which selects the type of scale induced 
by dim and triggers existential quantifi cation of the value c in accordance with the 
Unspecifi ed Argument Rule, (cf. Lang 1985; Bierwisch 1989: 76) such that the SF of, e.g., 
The pole is long comes out as in (41), where def.pole’ abbreviates the meaning of the 
subject the pole:
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(41) ∃c [[quant max def.pole’] = [Norm
pole
 + c]]
This much on SF variables coming with dimension terms and on their instantiation in 
structural contexts that are provided by the morphosyntax of the sentence at issue. After 
a brief look at the elements instantiating the metavariable dim, we will discuss a type of 
SF variable that is rooted in the lexical fi eld structure of DA terms.
Conceived as a basic module of cognition, dimension assignment to spatial objects 
involves entities and operations at three levels. The perceptual level provides the sensory 
input from vision and other senses; the conceptual level serves as a fi lter system reducing 
perceptual distinctions to the level that our everyday knowledge of space needs, and 
the semantic level accounts for the ways in which conceptually approved features are 
encoded in categorized lexemes and arranged in lexical fi elds.
DA basically draws on Dimension Assignment Parameters (DAP) that are provided 
by two frames of reference, which determine the dimensional designation of spatial 
objects:
(42) a. The Inherent Proportion Schema (IPS) yields proportion-based gestalt fea-
tures by identifying the object’s extents as maximal, minimal, and across axis, 
respectively.
 b.  The Primary Perceptual Space (PPS) yields contextually determined position 
features of spatial objects by identifying the object’s extents as aligned with the 
vertical axis, with the observer axis, and/or with an across axis in between.
The DAP in small caps listed in (42) occur in two representational formats that 
refl ect the SF vs. CS distinction. In SF representations, the DAP fi gure as functor 
constants of category N/N in the SF of L-particular dimension terms that instantiate 
{dim} within the general schema in (40). In CS representations, elements of the DAP 
inventory fi gure as conceptual features in so-called Object Schemata (cf. 4.2 below) 
that contain the conceptually defi ning as well as the contextually specifi ed spatial 
features of the object at issue.
Lang (2001) shows that the lexical fi eld of spatial dimension terms in a lan-
guage L is determined by the share it has in IPS and PPS, respectively. While ref-
erence to the vertical is ubiquitous, the lexical coverage of DA terms amounts to 
the following typology: proportion-based languages (Mandarin, Russian) adhere to 
IPS, observer-based ones (Korean, Japanese) adhere to PPS, and mixed-type ones 
(English, German) draw on an overlap between IPS and PPS. The semantic effects 
of this typology are inter alia refl ected by the respective across terms: In P-based 
and in O-based languages, they are lexically distinct and referentially unambiguous, in 
mixed-type languages like English they lack both of these properties.
Note the referential ambiguity of the English across term wide in (44.1) and 
its contextualized interpretations in (44.2 – 4) when referring to a board sized 100 × 
30 × 3 cm in the spatial settings I–III shown in (43):
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(43) 











   a = long, b = wide      a = wide, b = high     a = wide, b = deep
(44) 1. The board is wide enough, but too thin.  [I: wide = b; II & 
III: wide = a]
 2. The board is long and wide enough, but too thin. [wide = b as in setting I]
 3. The board is high and wide enough, but too thin. [wide = a as in setting II]
 4. The board is deep and wide enough, but too thin. [wide = a as in setting III]
As regards the manner of DA, note the following pairwise differences: (43 I) and 
(44.2) refer to the board as such by confi ning its DA to P-based gestalt properties, 
whereas (43 II, III) and (44.2, 3) account for the board’s increasing integration into the 
surrounding spatial context. This in turn entails that (44.2) can be applied to setting II 
or III as well, but (44.4 and 3) may not be applied to setting II and I, respectively. Now 
let us look at the relationship between object extents and DA terms.
Whereas the coupling of extent c and the term thin (or its antonym thick) is 
constant in I–III, the across term wide can refer to a or to b. The choice is deter-
mined by the situational context, cf. (43 I–III), and/or the linguistic context available, 
cf. (44.1–4). In short, the English across term wide selects an object extent d that is 
orthogonal to an object extent d’, with d’ ∈ {max, vert, obs}. The set includes those 
dimensions from IPS (max) and from PPS (vert, obs) that are independently assign-
able to object extents. The inherent relativity of wide requires its SF to contain – 
in addition to the schema in (4) – an ∃-bound variable d’ to be instantiated in the 
situational and/or the linguistic context:
(45) λc [λx [∃d’ [[quant across ⊥ d’ x ] = [ v  c ]]]],
 with d’ ∈ {max, vert, obs}
Without contextual clues about d’, wide is ambiguous or unspecifi ed between refer-
ring to extent a or to extent b, cf. (44.1). In the spatial settings in (43 I–III), the 
relevant extent d’ is visible, in the sentences (44.2–4) d’ is linguistically accessible. 
The intermodal equivalence of visual and verbal contexts wrt. selecting the constant 
that replaces d’ provides a strong argument for the view that the specifi cation of the 
object extent which wide refers to takes place at the CS level. It is CS representa-
tions that provide the visual and/or linguistic information based on which the selec-
tional restriction “d’ ∈ {max, vert, obs}” in (45) can be operative, cf. (43) and (44). 
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However, the restriction on d’ is not just an idiosyncratic feature of the lexical item 
wide/small but a condition on DA terms in L following from its typological make-up 
as a P/O-mixed-type language. Correspondingly, P-based languages restrict across 
terms to IPS requiring “d’ ∈ {max}”, and O-based languages to PPS by requiring “d’ 
∈ {obs}”, cf. Lang (2001) for details.
Now, having located the source of the referential ambiguity of wide – small at the 
SF level and identifi ed CS as the level where the ambiguity is resolved, provided that 
suitable context information is available, we want to know how the spatial settings 
shown in (43) and verbally described in (44) can be homogenized at the level of CS 
representations.
4.2. Object Schemata as CS representations
A suitable way of representing concepts of spatial objects is by means of a matrix 
with 3 rows and up to 3 columns, called Object Schema (OS), cf. Lang (1989, 1990); 
Lang, Carstensen & Simmons (1991). An OS contains entries which represent 
spatial properties of objects in three tiers.
The 1st row represents an object’s (i) dimensionality by variables for object axes, 
i.e. a, a b, or a b c, ordered by their relative salience such that within the general 
OS for buildings the entry vert in a vs. b vs. c differentiates the OS of a sky-scraper 
from that of an apartment house or of a bungalow; (ii) boundedness by <…> to set 
apart undimensionable objects (sky, weather) or objects named by mass nouns (air, 
water); (iii) integration of axes by (…) to distinguish a disk < (a b) c > from a pole 
< a (b c) > and a ball < (a b c) >.
The 2nd row lists the object’s gestalt and position properties by primary entries 
like max, min, vert, obs, which stand either for (i) axial concepts induced by DA 
terms whose SF contains max, min, vert, obs or for (ii) concepts activated by non-
linguistic, i.e. visual or tactile, input on the object at issue. Empty cells with Ø in 
the 2nd row mark object extents that may be designated by several distinct DAP 
depending on the position properties attributed to the object at hand.
The 3rd row (separated by a horizontal line) displays the results of contextualizing 
the entries in the 2nd row and hence the contextually specifi ed DA of the object at 
issue. The mapping between DAP as SF functor constants in small caps and their 
counterparts in OS as CS entries in lower case letters involves two operations defi ned 
as follows:
(46) a. Identifi cation: P ⇒ p,
  with P ∈ { max, min, across, vert, obs …},
     p ∈ { max, min, across, vert, obs …} and p is a 3rd row entry in OS
 b. Specifi cation: Q ⇒ p,
  with Q ∈ { vert, obs, across, … },
     p ∈ { max, Ø, vert, ….} and p is licensed as a landing site for Q in OS
(47) below shows the distinct OS serving as CS representations of the board in the 
settings in (43) as well as of the utterance meanings of the sentences in (44). To elu-
cidate (i) the intermodal equivalence of the context information available from (43) 
or (44) and (ii) how it is refl ected in the corresponding OS, the setting numbers and 
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the pertinent DA terms for a and b have been added in (47). The respective extent 
chosen as d’ to anchor across in the OS at issue and/or to interpret wide in (44.2–4) 
is in boldface.
(47)   I II III
 < a b c > < a b c > < a b c >
 max Ø min max Ø min max Ø min
 max across min   across vert min   across obs min
 a = long, b = wide   a = wide, b = high   a = wide, b = deep
The OS in (47) as CS representations of (43) and (44) capture all semantic aspects 
of DA discussed so far but they deserve some further remarks. First, (47-I) results 
from primary identifi cation à la (46a) indicated by matching entries in the 2nd and 
3rd row, while (47-II and III) are instances of contextual specifi cation as defi ned in 
(46b). Second, the typological characteristics of a P/O-mixed-type language are met 
as d’ for wide may be taken from IPS as in (47 I) or from PPS as in (47 II and III). 
Third, the rows of an OS, which contain the defi ning spatial properties and possibly 
also some contextual specifi cations, can be taken as a heuristic cue for designing 
the SF representations of object names that lexically refl ect the varying degree of 
integration into spatial contexts we observe in (43–44), e.g. board (freely movable) 
< notice-board (hanging) < windowsill (bottom part of a window) – in this respect 
OS may be seen as an attempt to capture what Bierwisch (article 16 in this volume) 
calls “dossiers”. Fourth, Lang, Carstensen & Simmons (1991) presents a Prolog 
system of DA using OS enriched by sidedness features, and Lang (2001) proposes a 
detailed catalogue of types of spatial objects with their OS accounting for primary 
entries and for contextually induced orientation or perspectivization. Fifth, despite 
their close interaction by means of the operations in (46), DAP as elements of SF 
representations and OS entries as CS elements are subject to different constraints, 
which is another reason to keep them distinct. The entries in an OS are subject to 
conditions of conceptual compatibility that inter alia defi ne the set of admissible 
complex OS entries listed as vertically arranged pairs in (48):
(48)  max max max Ø Ø Ø
 across vert obs across vert obs
An important generalization is that (48) holds independently of the way in which 
the complex entry happens to come about. So, the combination of max and vert in 
the same column may result from primary identifi cation in the 2nd row, cf. The pole 
is 2m tall, where the SF of tall contains max & vert x as a conjunction of DAP, or 
from contextual specifi cation, cf. The pole is 2m high, where vert is added in the 3rd 
row. The semantic structure of DA terms is therefore constrained by compatibility 
conditions at the CS level but within this scope it is cross-linguistically open to dif-
ferent lexicalization patterns and to variation of what is covered by the SF of single 
DA terms.
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Finally, whereas OS may contain one or more Ø or entries that have a share in 
both IPS and PPS (as does e.g. across), the DA of spatial objects by linguistic means 
is subject to the following uniqueness constraint:
(49)  In an instance of naming distinct axial extents a, b, c of some object x by 
enumerating DA terms, each DAP and each extent may occur only once.
Reminiscent of the Θ-criterion, (49) excludes e.g. (i) *The board is long and wide 
enough, but too small or (ii) *The pole is 2m long and 2m high/tall as ill-formed. 
Though disguised by distinct lexical labels, wide and small in (i) are confl icting occur-
rences of the DAP across, whereas long and high/tall in (ii) compete for one and the 
same extent a. The uniqueness constraint in (49) exemplifi es one of the pragmatic 
felicity conditions on linguistic communication; cf. §1.4 above. Structurally, (49) fol-
lows from the homogeneity condition on the conjuncts in coordinate structures; 
theoretically, (49) is an outcome of the Gricean Maxim of Manner, especially of the 
sub-maxim “Avoid ambiguity!”.
4.3. Inferences
The distinction of SF vs. CS representations, hitherto exemplifi ed by DAP as SF con-
stants for dimension terms and by OS as a CS format for spatial objects, respectively, 
is also relevant to the way inferences in the realm of spatial cognition are semanti-
cally accounted for. The SF vs. CS distinction outlined by (2)–(5) in §1.2 reappears 
in a division of labor between (i) inferences that draw on permanent lexical knowl-
edge made available in SF format and (ii) inferences that are performed on contex-
tually specifi ed CS representations. We will illustrate this correlation by means of 
three groups of data.
4.3.1. Lexical antonymy
While hyponymy and synonymy are non-typical lexical relations among DA terms, 
various facets of antonymy seem to be indispensable to them; cf. Lang 1995. The SF 
of DA terms, cf. (40) and (45), is componential as it results from decomposing the 
meaning of lexical items into suitable building blocks, that is, into SF components 
which are interrelated by meaning postulates and which therefore allow for purely 
lexicon-based inferences. There are two sorts: (i) schema-forming SF components 
(e.g. become and cause, cf. Bierwisch 2005, 2010; Wunderlich 1997a); and (ii) schema-
fi lling SF components (e.g. the elements of {dim} in (42) and (46) or operative 
elements like ‘∃’, ‘’ or ‘=’ in (45)).
Two DA terms are lexical antonyms if (i) they share the same DAP in forming 
polar opposites, (ii) assign contrary values to d, (iii) allow for converse compara-
tives etc. Inferences that draw on lexical antonymy show up in entailments between 
sentences, cf. (50), and are codifi ed as lexical knowledge postulates at the SF level, 
cf. (51). We neglect details concerning ‘=’, abbreviate SF (the board) by B, and take 
N(orm value) and K(ey value) to instantiate the comparison value v in (50a) and 
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(50b), respectively. For the whole range of entailments and SF postulates based on 
DA terms see Bierwisch (1989).
(50) a. The board is short → The board is not long.
 b. The board is not long enough  ↔ The board is too short
(51) a. ∃c [[ quant max B] = [N – c ]] ⇒ ∼ [∃c [[∃c [[ quant max B] = [N + c ]]]
 b. ∼ [∃c [[ quant max B] = [K + c ]]] ⇔ ∃c [[ quant max B] = [K – c ]]
4.3.2. Contextually induced dimensional designation
Valid inferences like those in (52) are accounted for, and invalid ones like those in (53) 
are avoided, by drawing on the information provided by, or else lacking in, contextually 
specifi ed OS.
(52) a. The board is 1m wide and 0.3 m high → The board is 1m long and 0.3m wide
 b. The pole is 2m tall/2m high → The pole is 2m long
(53) a. The wall is wide and high enough –→ The wall is long and wide enough
 b. The tower is 10 m tall/high –→ *The tower is 10 m long.
The valid inferences result from the operation of de-specifi cation, which is simply the 
reverse of the operation of contextual specifi cation defi ned in (46b):
(54) De-specifi cation:
 a. For any OS for x with a vertical entry < p, q >, there is an OS’ with < p, p >.
 b.  For any OS for x with a vertical entry < Ø, q >, there is an OS’ with < Ø, 
across >.
The inferences in (53a, b) are ruled out as invalid because the OS under review do 
not contain the type of entries needed for (54) to apply.
4.3.3. Commensurability of object extents
Note that the DA terms long, wide and/or thick are not hyponyms to big despite the fact 
that big may refer to the [v + c] of one, two or all three extents of a 3D object, depending 
on the OS of the objects at issue. When objects differing in dimensionality are compared 
by using the DA term big, the dimensions it covers are determined by the common share 
of the OS involved, cf. (55):
(55) a. My car is too big for the parking space. (too long and/or too wide)
 b. My car is too big for the garage door. (too wide and/or too high)
So it is above all the two mapping operations between SF and CS representations as 
defi ned in (46a, b) and exemplifi ed by DAP and OS that account for the whole range of 
seemingly complicated facts about DA to spatial objects.
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5. Summary and outlook
In this article we have reported on some pros and cons related to distinguishing SF and 
CS representations and illustrated them by data and facts from a selection of semantic 
phenomena. Now we briefl y outline the state of the art in more general terms and take a 
look at the desiderata that defi ne the agenda for future research.
The current situation can be summarized in three statements: (i) the SF vs. CS dis-
tinction brings in clear-cut advantages as shown by the examples in §§ 2–4; (ii) we still 
lack reliable heuristic strategies for identifying the appropriate SF of a lexical item; 
(iii) it is diffi cult to defi ne the scope of variation a given SF can cover at CS level.
What we urgently need is independent evidence for the basic assumption underlying 
the distinction: SF representations and CS representations differ in nature as they are 
subject to completely different principles of organization. By correlating the SF vs. CS 
distinction with distinctions relevant to other levels of linguistic structure formation, 
cf. (2)–(5) in section 1, the article has taken some steps in that direction. One of them 
is to clarify the differences between SF and CS that derive from their linguistic vs. 
non-linguistic origin; cf. (4).
The linguistic basis of the SF-representations of DA terms, for instance, is manifested 
(i) in the DAP constants’ interrelation by postulates underlying lexical relations, (ii) in 
participating in certain lexicalization patterns (e.g. proportion-based vs. observer-based), 
(iii) in being subject to the uniqueness constraint in (49), which is indicative of the semio-
ticity of the system it applies to, whereas the Conceptual System CS is not a semiotic one. 
Pursuing this line of research, phenomena specifi c to natural languages like idiosyncra-
cies, designation gaps, collocations, connotations, folk etymologies etc. should be scruti-
nized for their possible impact on establishing SF as a linguistically determined level of 
representation.
The non-linguistic basis of CS-representations, e.g. OS involved in DA, is manifested 
(i) in the fact that OS entries are exclusively subject to perception-based compatibility 
conditions; (ii) in their function to integrate input from the spatial environment regardless 
of the channel it comes in; (iii) in their property to allow for valid inferences to be drawn 
on entries that are induced as contextual specifi cations. To deepen our understanding 
of CS-representations, presumptions like the following deserve to be investigated on a 
broader spectrum and in more detail: (i) CS representations may be underspecifi ed in 
certain respects, cf. the role of  ‘Ø’ in OS, but as they are not semiotic entities they are not 
ambiguous; (ii) the compatibility conditions defi ning admissible OS suggest that the fol-
lowing relation may hold wrt. the well-formedness of representations: sortal restrictions 
⊂ selectional restrictions; (iii) CS representations have to be contingent since contradic-
tory entries cause the system of inferences to break down; contradictions at SF level 
trigger accommodation activities.
As the agenda above suggests, a better understanding of the interplay of linguistic 
and non-linguistic aspects of meaning constitution along the lines developed here is par-
ticularly to be expected from interdisciplinary research combining methods and insights 
from linguistics, psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics and cognitive psychology.
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